"During the early years of the Cold War, Canada and the United States worked to develop a peacetime defence relationship. At first, military co-operation was confined to the construction of minor defence installations and the creation of joint defence plans. But in 1950, both countries began to develop an air defence system to defend North America from Soviet long-range nuclear bombers. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations requested that Canada agree to the construction of several major early warning radar systems on its territory: the Pinetree Line, the Mid Canada Line, and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line in the Arctic. Despite the power disparity between the two countries, Mathew Trudgen argues that Canada played an important role in the decision making behind the defence system. It was not a smooth process, however, with disagreement among branches of Canadian government and the military, especially Cabinet, External Affairs, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. Trudgen argues that these entities of the Canadian political establishment and armed forces had different conceptions of the national interest, and this helps to explain their positions, priorities, and arguments in defence cooperation discussions. The chapters explore the development of the North American air defence system and the Canada-US defence relationship from 1945 to the founding of NORAD in 1958. Early chapters discuss the emergence of the peacetime defence relationship, fears that the Americans were planning to develop a massive air defence system on Canadian soil, the emergence of the Soviet strategic bomber threat, and the first attempts by Canada and the United States to co-ordinate their air defence forces. Later chapters examine the negotiations over the implementation of joint radar warning systems, debates over American air defence policy under Truman and Eisenhower, and the creation of NORAD."-- Provided by publisher.